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January 28, 2013

Justices Yegan, Perren, Gilbert, and Judge Hoffstadt  
California Court of Appeal  
Second Appellate District, Division Six  
200 East Santa Clara St.  
Ventura, CA 93001

Re: Request for Publication of *Save Cuyama Valley v. County of Santa Barbara*  
(January 10, 2013; Case No. B233318)

Dear Justices Gilbert, Yegan, Perren, and Judge Hoffstadt:

On behalf of the League of California Cities (the "League") and the California State Association of Counties ("CSAC"), we request that the Court of Appeal 2nd Appellate District publish the opinion *Save Cuyama Valley v. County of Santa Barbara* (January 10, 2013; Case No. B233318 [the "Opinion"]) pursuant to California Rule of Court ("CRC"), Rule 8.1120(a).

### I. INTEREST

The League is an association of 469 California cities dedicated to protecting and restoring local control to provide for the public health, safety, and welfare of their residents, and to enhance the quality of life for all Californians. The League is advised by its Legal Advocacy Committee, which is comprised of 24 city attorneys from all regions of the State. The Committee monitors litigation of concern to municipalities, and identifies those cases that have statewide or nationwide significance. The Committee has identified this case as having such significance.

CSAC is a non-profit corporation. The membership consists of the 58 California counties. CSAC sponsors a Litigation Coordination Program, which is administered by the County Counsels' Association of California and is overseen by the Association's Litigation Overview Committee, comprised of county counsels throughout the state. The Litigation Overview Committee monitors litigation of

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concern to counties statewide and has determined that this case is a matter affecting all counties.

The continued development of case law addressing California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA") issues assists cities, counties, and other public agencies in complying with CEQA while avoiding the expenditure of public money on unnecessary, premature, or legally inadequate CEQA review. For the reasons described below, we request that the Court of Appeal publish the Opinion.

## II. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION

As described in greater detail below, we believe the Opinion meets the standards for publication under CRC, Rule 8.1105(c)(1) ["Establishes a new rule of law"]; CRC, Rule 8.1105 (c)(2) ["Applies an existing rule of law to a set of facts significantly different from those stated in published opinions"]; CRC, Rule 8.1105 (c)(4) ["advances a new interpretation...of a...statute"]; and CRC, Rule 8.1105(c)(6) ["involves a legal issue of continuing public interest"].)

### A. Thresholds of Significance

The Opinion significantly adds to and clarifies the law governing the role of the State CEQA Guidelines Appendix G and its relationship to significance criteria for Environmental Impact Reports ("EIRs"). In Section (A)(1) of the "Discussion" portion of the Opinion, the Court restates Save Cuyama's assertions that "(1) the County may not deviate from the threshold of significance in Appendix G of the CEQA Guidelines ("Appendix G") unless it formally adopts a different threshold; ...and (3) the County did not in any event explain why it was not using Appendix G's threshold." (Slip Opinion at pages 7-8.) In affirming the denial of the petition on these grounds, the Court explained that:

...the court [sic] was not required to explain why it did not use Appendix G's thresholds of significance. Those thresholds are "only" a "suggest[ion]." (CEQA Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (f).) To require any deviation from them to be documented and justified, as Save Cuyama suggests, is to elevate Appendix G from a suggested threshold to the presumptive threshold. This flatly contradicts both CEQA's description of Appendix G as only suggested and CEQA's mandate that agencies have the power to devise their own thresholds. (Ibid.)

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In the Opinion, the Court relies upon *Protect the Historic Amador Waterways v. Amador Water Agency* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1099, which concluded that CEQA Guidelines Appendix G does not constitute an exclusive listing of criteria which should be considered in determining the significance of potential environmental effects. In that case, the reviewing court noted that the lead agency may have to consider additional factors beyond those expressly identified in Appendix G. (*Id.* at 1109 – 1113.) The Court’s Opinion in this case addresses the exact opposite situation, in which a petitioner alleged that the Draft EIR *should not* have utilized alternate significance criteria which differed from those listed in Appendix G. In rejecting this contention, the Opinion further clarifies that the Appendix G significance criteria are advisory in nature, and not the only criteria which a lead agency may rely on in assessing the significance of environmental effects. Furthermore, no case that we are aware of has taken this issue one step further, providing that the public agency was not required to explain why it did not use the language from Appendix G as CEQA thresholds of significance. This Opinion, therefore, is worthy of publication, because the opinion “[a]pplies an existing rule of law to a set of facts significantly different from those stated in published opinions.” (CRC Rule 8.1105 (c)(2).)

The Opinion should also be published because it “involves a legal issue of continuing public interest.” On September 28, 2012, the attorney for Save Cuyama, Babak Naficy, filed a petition for writ of mandate on behalf of the Sierra Club which makes nearly identical allegations to those raised in the Opinion. (*Sierra Club v. County of Tulare* (County of Tulare Superior Court Case No. VCU249061.)<sup>1</sup> The petition for writ of mandate in *Sierra Club* alleges that “In several instances, the County violated CEQA by revising or abandoning the CEQA Guideline Appendix G thresholds of significance without any adequate explanation or substantial evidence supporting the revised threshold. In other instances, the County fails to adequately explain the basis for its adopted threshold of significance.” (*Id.* at ¶46.)

This issue also continues to arise at the administrative level. For example, in the Final EIR for the El Casco System Project, prepared by the California Public Utility Commission, a commenter alleged:

Yet, a number of significance criteria utilized in the Draft EIR are not derived from Appendix G and, in fact, vary from the significance thresholds identified

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<sup>1</sup> The Sohagi Law Group, PLC (“SLG”) represents public agencies throughout the State of California including Tulare County in the *Sierra Club* litigation; however, this request for publication is submitted on behalf of the League and CSAC.

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for the following resource areas...To deviate from the thresholds identified in Appendix G and CPUC past practice, the Draft EIR must provide substantial evidence to support that decision.... (Comment from Southern California Edison letter E1-12).<sup>2</sup>

Given that this issue continues to arise in litigation and at the administrative level, we request that the Court of Appeal publish the Opinion.

#### **B. Evidentiary Authentication**

Section (A)(2) of the "Discussion" portion of the Opinion states that "Save Cuyama contends that the Report's findings are deficient because they did not consider two photographs Save Cuyama proffered, as part of a PowerPoint presentation, that allegedly show headcutting." The Court, however, agreed with the County, which concluded that "the photos were meaningless unless authenticated. Nor did the County err in failing to investigate those photos on its own. Without authentication, follow-up would have been exceedingly difficult, if not impossible." (Slip opinion at 10.)

We are not aware of any published decision that has addressed evidentiary requirements (authentication) in the context of comment letters submitted by the public during the CEQA process. However, a number of public agencies have had difficulties in addressing CEQA comment letters that make factual assertions or submit photographs without any context or authentication. For example, in *Friends of the Whittier Narrows Natural Area v. San Gabriel River Discovery Center Authority* (2010, Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. BS125058), petitioners submitted photographs of random pieces of debris in their comment letter and alleged "The EDAW consultants state that they found no surface artifacts. In just two 15-minute inspections, I found that the Project Area indeed is covered with artifacts both large and small (See Figs. 1-14)."<sup>3</sup> Petitioners also stated that they spotted numerous special status species but provided no evidentiary support for these assertions. The

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<sup>2</sup> El Casco Final EIR Comment Letter E1 available online at:  
<http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/environment/info/asp/en/casco/FEIR/Section%203%20files/3E-C+R/3E%20-%20SCE%20Comments-Responses%20Set%20E1.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> San Gabriel River Discovery Center Final EIR, Comment, "Jack Bath Comments," pages 1 and 7-23, available at:  
[http://discoverycenterauthority.org/library/eir\\_final/pdf/Jack\\_Bath\\_comment\\_8-3-09.PDF](http://discoverycenterauthority.org/library/eir_final/pdf/Jack_Bath_comment_8-3-09.PDF)

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Court order denying the petition noted that “The commentator’s anecdotal claims of presence of special species in the project area were neither corroborated nor otherwise supported by substantial evidence.” (*Friends of the Whittier Narrows Natural Area v. San Gabriel River Discovery Center Authority*, 2010, Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. BS125058; 2nd District Court of Appeal Case No. B232561 [Appeal dismissed by Appellant]), Court Order denying petition for writ of mandate, submitted on 2-3-11.)<sup>4</sup> Therefore, this is an area of law of continuing public interest which has a high likelihood of repetition if the opinion remains unpublished.

Therefore, we believe the Opinion meets the standards for publication under CRC, Rule 8.1105(c)(1) [“Establishes a new rule of law”]; CRC, Rule 8.1105 (c)(4) [“advances a new interpretation...of a...statute”]; and CRC, Rule 8.1105(c)(6) [“involves a legal issue of continuing public interest”].)

### C. Combined Cumulative and Project Specific Thresholds

In Section (B)(1) of the “Discussion” portion of the Opinion, the court restates Save Cuyama’s assertions that the EIR is deficient because “the Report uses the same threshold of significance—31 afy—to assess the project’s individual and cumulative impacts...” The Court denied the petition on those grounds noting that:

The County’s 31 afy threshold of significance assesses *cumulative* impact. It was derived from an examination of the tolerable impact of an individual project on the amount of water available *basin-wide*. Thus, the County amply considered the cumulative impact of the Diamond Rock mine on the water supply of Cuyama River basin. What the Report lacks is an independent examination of the mine’s noncumulative impact on water usage. Such an examination is unnecessary, however, because the Report already finds the mine has no significance cumulative impact under what is an undoubtedly more stringent cumulative-impact threshold. (Slip Opinion at page 13.)

Similar issues have arisen in recent cases in the context of *cumulative air quality* analyses, but no case has yet addressed the propriety of using a combined project level and cumulative significance threshold for resource areas outside of air quality, such as water usage in the Opinion. In *Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth*

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<sup>4</sup> The Court order denying the petition for writ of mandate in *Friends of the Whittier Narrows Natural Area* is available online at:  
[http://www.sohagi.com/publications/NorwalkSuperiorCourt\\_BS125058.pdf](http://www.sohagi.com/publications/NorwalkSuperiorCourt_BS125058.pdf)

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v. *City of Rialto* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 899, the court upheld the agency's air quality analysis noting that:

...the SCAQMD recommends that a project's potential contribution to cumulative impacts should be assessed using the same significance criteria as those for project specific impacts. Therefore, individual development projects that generate construction-related or operational emissions that exceed the SCAQMD recommended daily thresholds for project-specific impacts would also cause a cumulative considerable increase in emissions for those pollutants for which the Basin is nonattainment. In view of the SCAQMD's recommendations, the EIR reasonably analyzed the project's cumulative impact on air quality based on the project's emissions alone. (*Id.* at 933.)

In *Citizens for Responsible Equitable Environmental Development v. City of Chula Vista* (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 327 petitioners alleged that "the Project may have a significant cumulative air-quality impact due to its contribution of particulate matter and NO<sub>x</sub> (an ozone precursor) in a nonattainment area." The Court of Appeal denied the petition on these grounds noting the same thresholds applied to both the project and cumulative analyses. (*Id.* at 334.)

We believe the discussion in the Opinion meets the standards for publication because it "[a]pplies an existing rule of law to a set of facts significantly different from those stated in published opinions," "[a]dvances a new interpretation...of a...statute," and "[i]nvolves a legal issue of continuing public interest." (CRC, Rule 8.1105 (c)(2), (c)(4), and (c)(6).) For all of these reasons, on behalf of the League and CSAC, we therefore, respectfully request that the Court of Appeal publish the Opinion.

Very truly yours,



R. TYSON SOHAGI (SBN 254235)  
On Behalf of the League of California Cities  
and the California State Association of  
Counties

**NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS**

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

SAVE CUYAMA VALLEY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

TROESH MATERIALS, INC.,

Real Party in Interest.

2d Civil No. B233318  
(Super. Ct. No. 1272650)  
(Santa Barbara County)

Plaintiff Save Cuyama Valley ("Save Cuyama") appeals from the judgment denying its petition for a writ of mandate. The County of Santa Barbara and its Board of Supervisors (collectively, "the County") granted Real Party in Interest Troesh Materials, Inc. ("Troesh") permission to begin sand and gravel mining in the bed of the Cuyama River. Save Cuyama asks us to overturn that decision. Save Cuyama contends that the Final Revised Environmental Impact Report ("Report") that formed the basis for the County's approval violates the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA") in a variety of ways. We reject Save Cuyama's arguments and affirm the judgment.

## *FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY*

### *A. The Diamond Rock Mine Project*

Nearly 10 years ago, Troesh applied to the County's Planning and Development Department for a conditional use permit to begin excavating and processing sand and gravel in a project called the "Diamond Rock mine." The mine would be located within the often dry bed of the Cuyama River at a stretch where it is 2,500 feet wide. The mine would excavate approximately 900 feet from the river's usual flow, and would process materials at a nearby facility above the riverbed. The mine would be located 5.9 miles southeast of the intersection of State Highways 33 and 166, approximately 1,500 feet upstream from another sand-and-gravel mine. This other mine is the 15-acre GPS mine. The GPS mine has operated in the river's path since 1969 and has excavated an average of 160,000 tons of material each year. The Diamond Rock mine would be excavated over time in a series of trenches, with a new trench being started once the prior trench reached the maximum depth of 90 feet. The mine would excavate an average of 500,000 tons each year, and by the end of the 30-year permit Troesh sought, would cover 84 acres.

### *B. The Final Revised Environmental Impact Report*

The County commissioned the preparation of an environmental impact report. Over the next several years, the County received comments and made several revisions. The Report was released in May 2007, and the Board of Supervisors adopted and certified it on September 23, 2008. Among other things,<sup>1</sup> the Report and administrative record upon which it is based address the following topics:

#### *1. Hydrological impacts on the Cuyama River*

The Cuyama River carries both water and sediment as it flows. Using a methodology developed by the Army Corps of Engineers called the Hydraulic Engineering Center's River Analysis System ("HEC-RAS"), the Report's consultants calculated that the Cuyama River deposits a net surplus of 229,000 tons of sediment each

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<sup>1</sup> We only discuss those portions of the Report challenged on appeal.



year in the area of the riverbed where the Diamond Rock and GPS mines would operate.<sup>2</sup> If both mines were to excavate sand and gravel *solely* from the river's flows, their combined annual extraction of 1 million tons per year (500,000 for the Diamond Rock mine and a new higher limit of 500,000 for the GPS mine) would result in an annual sediment deficit of 771,000 tons in that area. The Diamond Rock mine, however, would not be in the river's path and would be surrounded by "low flood control berms" (four feet high and ten feet wide at the base) to direct flows around the mine's excavations. The berms would not be impenetrable, however. During seasonal "substantial rain events," it is expected that the river would overrun the berms and flow into the mine's excavation pits.

The Report accordingly acknowledges that the Diamond Rock mine "could affect river hydraulics." The Report identifies three possible hydraulic impacts. First, the mine could cause "downstream channel degradation": If the river flows into an excavated pit, it would deposit its sediment in the pit and any water leaving the pit (once the pit is full) would carry less sediment and flow more quickly, which could scour the riverbed immediately downstream of the pit. Second, the mine could cause "headcutting": If the river flows over the upstream lip of the pit, the water and sediment in that flow could erode the lip and effectively cause the mine's upstream edge to migrate upriver. Third, the mine could cause "bank erosion": If the river's flow is diverted by the mine's berms, the new flow pattern could erode the banks of the river.

Notwithstanding the *possibility* of these impacts, the Report opines that they are not likely to occur. No channel degradation had occurred downstream of the GPS mine during the decades of its operation. The Report further reasons that the sediment-laden flood waters, once they fill the Diamond Rock mine's pits, would flow over those pits and fill in any downstream scouring damage, effectively "resetting" (or

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<sup>2</sup> The study calculated that, on its own, the river deposits 314,000 tons per year and carries away 85,000 tons per year, amounting to an annual net surplus of 229,000 tons.

filling in) any damage to the channel. Nor is headcutting likely, because the riverbed has a "very low" slope and the bed is composed of "enough large material . . . to armor the upstream lip of the pit"—observations confirmed by the absence of any headcutting during the 30-year life of the GPS mine. Bank erosion is also unlikely because the riverbed is over 2,000 feet wide at the mining sites and the river's flows are typically shallow, a prediction also confirmed by the absence of any bank erosion over the last few decades of mining.

To assess whether any of these possible but unlikely impacts are significant and in need of further analysis under CEQA, the Report defines a "threshold of significance." The Report cites the "Environmental Checklist from CEQA Guidelines Appendix G" ("Appendix G") and notes that any of Appendix G's 10 factors "could trigger a finding of potentially significant impact related to hydrology/flooding." The Report nonetheless adopts a more tailored threshold of significance for the particular hydrological effects outlined above: "Under CEQA, hydraulic impacts are considered adverse if they cause channel bed degradation and/or bank erosion that: 1) damage public infrastructure such as bridges or pipeline crossings; 2) damage or destroy adjacent developed land uses or structures due to bank erosion or flooding; 3) disturb, convert, or destroy valuable in-channel riparian habitat; or 4) expose people to a new flooding hazard."

The Report concludes that the "magnitude" of the three possible impacts previously identified are "expected to be minor" and would likely have no secondary impacts (to infrastructure, adjacent development or habitats). Thus, the Report concludes, the Diamond Rock mine's hydrological impacts "appear to be less than significant." Rather than stop there, however, the Report acknowledges "the inherent uncertainty of simulation models and the potential to underestimate [geomorphological] effects." The Report accordingly deems these impacts to be "potentially significant but mitigatable."

The Report then proposes Mitigation Measure W-2 ("MM W-2"), which Troesh must implement as a condition of the County's granting Troesh a conditional use

permit to operate the mine. MM W-2 requires Troesh to: (1) conduct a semi-annual survey of river bottom elevations in three locations (in the middle of the Diamond Rock mine pit, at 1,000 feet upstream and at 1,000 feet downstream of the mine); (2) submit this data for review by the State's Office of Mine Reclamation ("OMR"), the County's Planning and Development Department, and the County's Flood Control Distribute as part of the OMR's annual Surface Mining and Reclamation Act ("SMARA") compliance review; and (3) should "adverse hydraulic conditions [be] evident, or appear to be developing, which could result in off-site impacts," to confer with the County agencies to modify the mining pit layout, width and/or depth to avoid these impacts.

## *2. Impacts on water resources*

The Report analyzes two aspects of the Diamond Rock mine's effect on the local water supply pertinent to this appeal: usage and quality.

The Diamond Rock mine operation, along with its adjacent processing plant, would draw water locally for dust control and for processing, although Troesh anticipates a 74 percent recycling rate. To evaluate whether the mine's water consumption is significant within the meaning of CEQA, the Report uses the threshold of significance formally adopted by the County in its Environmental Threshold and Guidelines Manual ("Manual"). Although the most recent update to the groundwater thresholds was in August 1992, the County confirmed its continued validity by conferring with agency staff and by evaluating more recent studies. The Manual defines significance by referring to how a project's water usage would affect the water supply of the alluvial aquifer underlying the entire 1,140 square mile Cuyama River watershed. Because that watershed is in a state of "overdraft" (that is, more water is used than is naturally replenished), the Manual defines a project as "significant" if its net consumption exceeds 31 acre-feet per year ("afy"). The Report calculates the Diamond Rock mine's net consumption to be 28.12 afy, and accordingly classifies its impact as not significant.

The Diamond Rock mine could also affect the already "relatively poor" quality of the water in the Cuyama River basin if excavation exposes groundwater. Exposed groundwater could evaporate and leave more concentrated solids in the aquifer.

To assess the risk of such exposure, the Report looked at historical data for nearby wells to see how far below ground water was typically found. The depth of standing water in the wells varied from year to year and from season to season, but was usually between 40 and 110 feet below ground surface ("bgs"). The Report opined that the ground beneath the mine site was "expected to be saturated." The Report stated also that "[u]nder most conditions, groundwater would be located below the maximum mining depth [of 90 feet]."

The Report classified the mine's impact on water quality as "adverse, but not significant" for three reasons: (1) the "very low" frequency with which groundwater would be exposed; (2) the "very short" duration for which it would be exposed before percolating back into the ground; and (3) the "very small" surface area of the exposed groundwater "compared to the groundwater stored in the basin." The County nevertheless imposed a protective measure, Condition 64 of the Conditional Use Permit. This measure prohibits excavation "to the level of groundwater;" requires excavation to remain "at least an average of six feet above water level"; and obligates Troesh to backfill any pit to a depth of six feet should any groundwater be exposed.

### *C. Judicial Review of Report*

Save Cuyama petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate to compel the County to correct deficiencies with the Report. The court denied the writ, and this appeal followed.

### *DISCUSSION*

Our review is limited to ascertaining whether the County abused its discretion in approving the Report. (*Gentry v. City of Murrieta* (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1375 (*Gentry*)). An agency abuses its discretion if (1) it has not followed CEQA's procedures for preparing an environmental impact report; or (2) the report's findings are not supported by "substantial evidence"—that is, not supported by "enough relevant information and reasonable inferences from [that] information that a fair argument can be

made to support [the Report's conclusions]." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15384.)<sup>3</sup> We independently review the agency's compliance with CEQA's procedures (*Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection* (2008) 43 Cal.4th 936, 944), but accord considerable deference to the report's determinations—presuming them correct and resolving all reasonable doubts in their favor. (*Save Our Peninsula Comm. v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 117; *Sacramento Old City Assn. v. City Council* (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1019 (*Sacramento Old City Assn.*)) Because the goal of an environmental impact report is to provide information to decision makers and the public, (*Fairview Neighbors v. County of Ventura* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 238, 242), we are not concerned with the ultimate *correctness* of the report's conclusions, (*Eureka Citizens for Responsible Government v. City of Eureka* (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 357, 372). Save Cuyama bears the burden of proving the Report's inadequacy. (*Save Our Peninsula, supra*, at p. 117.)<sup>4</sup>

#### A. Hydrological Impacts

Save Cuyama raises three challenges to the Report's analysis of the Diamond Rock mine's hydrological impacts on the Cuyama River: (1) the County violated CEQA in defining its threshold of significance for assessing the impacts; (2) substantial evidence does not support the Report's finding that the mine's hydrological impacts are minor; and (3) MM W-2 is too nebulous to satisfy CEQA.

##### 1. Threshold of significance

Save Cuyama asserts that the County's decision to use, as a threshold of significance, its own four-part definition of "adverse hydraulic impacts" violated CEQA for three reasons: (1) the County may not deviate from the threshold of significance in Appendix G of the CEQA Guidelines ("Appendix G") unless it formally adopts a

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<sup>3</sup> Further references to the Code of Regulations are referred to as CEQA Guidelines.

<sup>4</sup> Because we review the agency's action without regard to the trial court's rulings (*Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 427), we do not discuss that court's decision.

different threshold; (2) even if no formal adoption is required, the Report's citation of two thresholds makes it unclear which one the Report used; and (3) the County did not in any event explain why it was not using Appendix G's threshold.

Save Cuyama's first argument lacks merit. Although an agency must determine whether "any of the *possible* significant environmental impacts of [a] project will, in fact, be significant" (*Protect The Historic Amador Waterways v. Amador Water Agency* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1109), CEQA grants agencies discretion to develop their own thresholds of significance (CEQA Guidelines, § 15064, subd. (d)). More to the point, CEQA only requires that a threshold be formally adopted if it is for "general use"—that is, for use in evaluating significance in all future projects. (*Id.* at subd. (b).) Because the County's threshold in this case was specific to this Report (and hence not for "general use"), Save Cuyama is incorrect in asserting that formal adoption was required. (*Oakland Heritage Alliance v. City of Oakland* (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 884, 896.)

We also reject Save Cuyama's argument that it was unclear what threshold the Report applied. As noted above, the Report cited Appendix G's factors as those that "could trigger a finding of significant impact." But when the Report turned to the hydrological impacts of the Diamond Rock mine, it defined and applied its own "adverse hydraulic impacts" threshold. This is not ambiguous. Nor is the Report misleading when it refers to its project-specific threshold as being "under CEQA." CEQA permits an agency to define its own project-specific thresholds, so any threshold so adopted is "under CEQA." (CEQA Guidelines, § 15064, subd. (d).)

Further, the court was not required to explain why it did not use Appendix G's thresholds of significance. Those thresholds are "only" a "suggest[ion]." (CEQA Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (f).) To require any deviation from them to be documented and justified, as Save Cuyama suggests, is to elevate Appendix G from a suggested threshold to the presumptive threshold. This flatly contradicts both CEQA's description of Appendix G as only suggested and CEQA's mandate that agencies have the power to devise their own thresholds. (*Ibid.*)

## 2. *Substantial evidence to support impact analysis*

Save Cuyama challenges three different findings the County makes in its analysis of the Diamond Rock mine's hydrological impacts as unsupported by substantial evidence. Each challenge fails.

First, Save Cuyama argues that the Report does not support its finding that any hydrological impact of the Diamond Rock mine on the Cuyama River will be of "minor" "magnitude." In Save Cuyama's view, the combined extraction load of the Diamond Rock and GPS mines will create a sediment deficit of 771,000 tons each year, and the impact of such a deficit is necessarily significant. This impact, moreover, cannot be minimized or explained away by reference to anecdotal evidence regarding the hydrological impact of the lower-yield GPS mine alone. Relatedly, the Report is wrong in finding that any hydrological damage will be temporary because periodic heavy floods will repair any damage. These deficiencies in the Report, Save Cuyama asserts, were noted by the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and Save Cuyama's own experts.

The Report's assessment of the Diamond Rock mine's hydrological impacts is supported by substantial evidence. To begin with, the Report explains why the sediment deficiency does not inevitably translate into adverse hydrological impacts. In particular, the Report explains that the mine would for the most part extract material from the river's *bed*, not the river's *flows* (or, more to the point, from the sediment those flows carry). Although, as the Report acknowledges, the Diamond Rock mine will sometimes capture some of the annual 229,000 tons of surplus sediment naturally deposited in that portion of the riverbed when the mine's berms are overrun, the Report explains in detail why downstream channel degradation and headcutting are nonetheless unlikely to occur or to have any "adverse hydraulic impact."

The Report also adequately explains why the cumulative prior impact of the smaller GPS mine is relevant in assessing the combined future impact of the GPS and Diamond Rock mines. The absence of any headcutting or downstream channel degradation with the GPS mine sheds light on the vulnerability of the riverbed in this area

to those impacts. This vulnerability turns on considerations such as the composition of the rock, and not on the volume of the sediment extracted.

Furthermore, the Report sufficiently explains why the riverbed would be replenished by the surplus sediment that would be deposited by flows passing over previously scoured areas once any upstream pits in the path of the river were filled. The substantiality of evidence is not, as Save Cuyama suggests, undermined by the differing expert opinions of the EPA and Save Cuyama's experts. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15151 ["[d]isagreement among experts does not make an [environmental impact report] inadequate"]; *California Native Plant Society v. City of Rancho Cordova* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 603, 626.)

Second, Save Cuyama contends that the Report's findings are deficient because they did not consider two photographs Save Cuyama proffered, as part of a PowerPoint presentation, that allegedly show headcutting. The County noted, however, that the photos were meaningless unless authenticated. Nor did the County err in failing to investigate those photos on its own. Without authentication, follow-up would have been exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.

Third, Save Cuyama argues that the Report is internally inconsistent because it finds the hydrological impacts to be minor, but nonetheless declares them to be significant but mitigatable. Worse yet, the Report makes no effort to quantify them. We see no inconsistency. The Report frankly acknowledges no present or likely impacts of any significant magnitude, but out of an abundance of caution and due to the uncertainties of predicting and quantifying these impacts, elects to treat the impacts as *more* significant than they currently appear to be.

### 3. *Sufficiency of MM W-2*

Save Cuyama levels three attacks on MM W-2. As an initial matter, Save Cuyama contends that MM W-2 is defective because its "trigger" for requiring corrective action—"adverse hydraulic conditions"—is undefined or, at best, inconsistently defined.

CEQA usually requires mitigation measures to be defined in advance. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B); *Sacramento Old City Assn.*, *supra*, 229



Cal.App.3d at p. 1027.) But deferral is permitted if, in addition to demonstrating some need for deferral, the agency (1) commits itself to mitigation; and (2) spells out, in its environmental impact report, the possible mitigation options that would meet "specific performance criteria" contained in the report. (*Sacramento Old City Assn.*, *supra*, at pp. 1027-1029; Pub. Resources Code, § 21100, subd. (b)(3); *Endangered Habitat Leagues v. County of Orange* (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 772, 793.)

The County has demonstrated its commitment to mitigation by conditioning the issuance of Troesh's conditional use permit on compliance with MM W-2. MM W-2's trigger is also legally sufficient for two intertwined reasons. First, MM W-2's reference to "adverse hydraulic conditions" with "offsite impacts" tracks the language of "adverse" "hydraulic impacts" contained in the Report and thereby incorporates that definition. Second, MM W-2 requires compliance with SMARA, which is administered by the OMR. "[A] condition requiring compliance with environmental regulations is a common and reasonable mitigating measure." [Citation.]" (*Gentry*, *supra*, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1394; *Defend the Bay v. City of Irvine* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1276.) Furthermore, these two definitions dovetail neatly, for the Report's definition of "adverse" "hydraulic impacts" closely tracks the regulatory standard of SMARA set forth in CEQA Guidelines section 3710, subdivision (c).

We reject Save Cuyama's related argument that reliance on the Report's definition of "adverse hydraulic impacts" is inconsistent with MM W-2's requirement that Troesh be vigilant for "evidence of headcutting or channel degradation." MM W-2's citation to these two conditions, by its plain terms, sets forth what is to be monitored—not when action is required. Indeed, the only wrinkle we find is that MM W-2 is triggered not only when "adverse hydraulic conditions" are "evident," but also when those conditions "appear to be developing." However, we have found no authority precluding an agency from requiring mitigation prior to a fixed and clear trigger condition when doing so is *more* protective of the environment.

Save Cuyama next asserts that MM W-2 does not spell out the criteria by which its effectiveness will be evaluated. A deferred mitigation measure should set forth

a "specific and mandatory performance standards to ensure that the measure[], as implemented, will be effective." (*Communities for a Better Environment v. City of Richmond* (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 70, 94.) MM W-2 requires Troesh to "avoid these impacts." This necessarily refers to the "adverse hydraulic conditions . . . which could result in off-site impacts" that, as noted above, are sufficiently definite.

Save Cuyama lastly contends that MM W-2's remedial alternatives—"modifying the mining pit lay-out, width and/or depth"—do not go far enough because they do not include reduction of the annual extraction load. Substantial evidence therefore does not support a finding the MM W-2 will be effective, as required by *Gray v. County of Madera* (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1116-1119. The impacts to be mitigated here, however, are channel degradation and headcutting having the offsite impacts as defined in the Report and in CEQA Guideline section 3710, subdivision (c). Because these impacts are caused by how water flows into and out of the mining pits, measures to reconfigure the orientation of those pits (that is, their layout, width and depth) address those impacts.

## B. *Water Impacts*

### 1. *Water usage*

Save Cuyama argues that the Report's analysis of the Diamond Rock mine's effect on the water supply of the Cuyama Valley is deficient because: (1) the Report uses the same threshold of significance—31 afy—to assess the project's individual and cumulative impacts; and (2) the 31 afy standard is out of date.

Under CEQA, a project having no significant effect on the environment when considered by itself may nonetheless have such an impact when considered in conjunction with—or cumulatively to—other past, existing or planned environmental influences. (CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15130, subd. (a) & 15064, subd. (h)(1).) This is why the "[a]ssessment of a project's cumulative impact on the environment is a critical aspect of the [environmental impact report]." (*Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. City of Los Angeles* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1025.) Because, in most cases, the threshold for assessing the significance of the impact of a project on its own will be higher than the

threshold for assessing its cumulative impact, Save Cuyama reasons that Report's threshold must be invalid for using the *same* 31 afy measure to assess individual *and* cumulative impact.

We disagree. The County's 31 afy threshold of significance assesses *cumulative* impact. It was derived from an examination of the tolerable impact of an individual project on the amount of water available *basin-wide*. Thus, the County amply considered the cumulative impact of the Diamond Rock mine on the water supply of the Cuyama River basin. What the Report lacks is an independent examination of the mine's noncumulative impact on water usage. Such an examination is unnecessary, however, because the Report already finds the mine has no significant cumulative impact under what is an undoubtedly more stringent cumulative-impact threshold.

Nor does the Report suffer from the analytical flaws found in *Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 692, *Communities for a Better Environment v. California Resources Agency* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 98, or *Los Angeles Unified School District v. City of Los Angeles, supra*, 58 Cal.App.4th 1019. The agencies in these cases erred by labeling a project's impact as insignificant merely because that impact was a "drop in the bucket" to an already existing environmental problem.

The Report's finding that the 1992 threshold remains relevant is supported by substantial evidence. Although there had been some additional agricultural water usage in the basin since 1992, the County consulted with its water agency and examined more recent studies and, on that basis, found that the 1992-defined threshold was still valid. Save Cuyama's disagreement does not undermine this substantial evidence.

## 2. *Water quality*

Save Cuyama challenges the Report's finding that Diamond Rock mine will not have a significant impact on water quality and that Condition 64 is a feasible means of mitigating adverse impacts.

There was no deficiency with Condition 64's requirement that Troesh fill in any water it encounters and at all times keep the bottom of its mine pits at least six feet above any water. This mitigation measure is a requirement of Troesh's conditional use

permit, sets forth a specific standard, and would be effective in halting exposure of water except in times of seasonal floods (when the pits will be flooded anyway).

However, we agree with Save Cuyama that the Report's conclusion that the Diamond Rock mine's impact on water quality is "not significant" is not supported by substantial evidence. This conclusion appears to rest on the Report's observation that "under most conditions, groundwater would be located below the proposed maximum mining depth" of 90 feet. This statement ostensibly forms the basis for the Report's finding that the groundwater would be exposed infrequently and briefly, and hence for the Report's conclusion that the mine's impact on water quality will not be significant. Yet this statement is in tension with the data showing that the groundwater in nearby wells is found anywhere between 40 and 110 feet below ground, as well as with other statements in the Report itself recounting the underlying well data.

Save Cuyama must still establish that the Report's unsupported conclusion regarding the severity of the environmental impact is prejudicial. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21005, subd. (a); *Sunnyvale West Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Sunnyvale City Council* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1385 (*Sunnyvale*)). An error is prejudicial when an agency fails to comply with a mandatory CEQA procedure or when a report omits information and thereby precludes informed decision making. (*Lighthouse Field Beach Rescue v. City of Santa Cruz* (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1182 (*Lighthouse*); *Schoen v. Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 556, 565.) We cannot overlook a prejudicial error by surmising that the project would have gone forward anyway. (*Sunnyvale, supra*, at p. 1388.)

But no prejudicial error occurred here. Instead, what we have is a report that sets for all the pertinent data and follows all the procedures, but comes to the wrong conclusion in classifying the severity of an environmental impact.

Save Cuyama has not shown how this error matters. Notwithstanding the Report's erroneous conclusion that the impact was not significant, the County still insisted that Troesh implement Condition 64. Critically, this condition obligates Troesh to ensure that no groundwater is exposed—at *whatever depth* it is encountered. Although

Save Cuyama contests the condition's efficacy, it does not dispute that the condition—if feasible—would be wholly effective in negating the mine's adverse impact on water quality. Consequently, on these facts, the Report's unsupported conclusion regarding significance is of no moment.

In these respects, this case is similar to *Federation of Hillside & Canyon Associations v. City of Los Angeles* (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1180. There, the court found no prejudice arising from the City's erroneous conclusion that mitigation of a significant impact was not feasible. The court so held after determining that report's mistaken conclusion had no effect on the report's informational content or its recommendations. (*Id.* at pp. 1206-1207.) The same is true here.

*San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center v. County of Merced* (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 655, cited by Save Cuyama, is not to the contrary. In that case, the environmental impact report incorrectly described the underlying project as *both* increasing mining operations and not increasing them. This sent "conflicting signals to decisionmakers." (*Id.* at pp. 655-656.) Put differently, the report's internal inconsistency "precluded informed decision making" and was, for that reason, prejudicial. (See *Lighthouse, supra*, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1182.) However, not all inconsistencies are prejudicial: "It is not enough . . . that [an environmental impact report] misstate[s] an aspect of a proposed project." (*Mount Shasta Bioregional Ecology Center v. County of Siskiyou* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 184, 226.)

The inconsistency here was not prejudicial. Unlike the report in *San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center*, the Report here did not inconsistently describe the Diamond Rock mine. Instead, the Report offered a summary of the well data (or perhaps an opinion to be drawn from that data) that was arguably inconsistent with the data itself—at least if one looks solely at the data and ignores the annual and seasonal variations in water levels. At most, this inconsistency spawned the erroneous conclusion regarding the significance of the mine's environmental impact. However, as we have explained, any error in that conclusion was not prejudicial.

*DISPOSITION*

We affirm the judgment denying the petition for a writ of mandate.  
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

HOFFSTADT, J.\*

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

PERREN, J.

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\* Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

James F. Rigali, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

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1 **PROOF OF SERVICE**

2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA )  
3 ) ss.  
4 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES )

5 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I  
6 am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is  
11999 San Vicente Boulevard, Suite 150, Los Angeles, California 90049.


7 On January 28, 2013, I served true copies of the following document(s) described  
8 as **REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION OF *SAVE CUYAMA VALLEY V. COUNTY OF  
SANTA BARBARA*** on the interested parties in this action as follows:

9  BY MAIL: I enclosed the document(s) in a sealed envelope or package addressed to  
10 the persons at the addresses listed in the Service List and placed the envelope for  
collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar  
11 with The Sohagi Law Group, PLC's practice for collecting and processing  
correspondence for mailing. On the same day that the correspondence is placed for  
12 collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United  
States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.

13 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the  
foregoing is true and correct.

14 Executed on January 28, 2013, at Los Angeles, California.

15  
16 Cheron J. McAleece  
17 Printed Name

  
18 Signature



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**Troesh Materials, Inc.: Real Party in  
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